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Abstract—An  approach  to  the  modelling  of  team 
sensemaking is presented that relies on the use of multiple 
agents  integrated  into  larger  communication  network 
structures.  Sensemaking  is  cast  as  a  type  of  constraint 
satisfaction problem, and thus the cognitive architecture of 
each agent within the model is implemented as a constraint 
satisfaction network. The effect of manipulating a number of 
communication  variables  (the  frequency  of  inter-agent 
communication, the type of information communicated and 
the point at which inter-agent communication takes place) 
are  explored  in  three  computer  simulation  studies.  The 
results suggest that precipitant forms of information sharing 
may  result  in  agents  assigning  undue  significance  to 
information  that  is  largely  consistent  or  compatible  with 
pre-existing  or  prevailing  cognitions.  These  results  are 
consistent  with  other  results  reported  in  the  distributed 
cognition literature, and they suggest that the future use of 
constraint satisfaction network models could have value in 
terms  of  improving  our  understanding  of  socially-
distributed cognition in military coalition environments. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive  processing  in  military  coalition  organizations 
typically  involves  the  coordinated  effort  of  multiple 
individuals. This raises important questions about how the 
various  features  of  military  coalition  environments  might 
affect  collective  cognitive  outcomes  (for  example,  those 
associated  with  planning  and  decision-making).  Features 
that might turn out to be important in this respect include 
the following: 
1.  Communication  Networks:  There  is  an  increasing 
reliance on mobile ad hoc networks (MANETS) within 
military coalitions, and this may significantly affect the 
dynamics of inter-agent communication. 
2.  Quality of Information: The information that must be 
processed  by  military  coalitions  is  seldom  perfect. 
Information  is  often  uncertain,  ambiguous  and 
conflicting, and in some cases it may be deliberately 
manipulated  by  hostile  agents  in  order  to  subvert 
coalition  decision-making  and  undermine  coalition 
situation awareness. 
3.  Cultural  Differences:  Cultural  differences  between 
the members of a coalition organization may lead to 
miscommunication and misunderstanding [see 1]. This 
may  stem  from  differences  in  language,  knowledge, 
training and experience. 
4.  Trust:  Different  levels  of  trust  between  agents  may 
lead  to  inefficiencies  in  information  processing.  For 
example, individuals from different groups may fail to 
adequately  integrate  available  information  into 
decision-making  processes  as  a  result  of  poor  trust 
relationships. 
5.  Limited  Information  Sharing:  The  sharing  of 
information  within  a  coalition  organization  may  be 
limited for a number of reasons. Security constraints 
may  limit  information  access,  communication 
networks  may  limit  information  distribution,  and 
differences  in  information  technology  may  make 
information  difficult  to  exploit  and  integrate  into 
ongoing cognitive processes.  
Clearly, this is not an exhaustive list of features; however, it 
does highlight some of the potential factors that may affect 
cognitive  processing  in  coalition  organizations,  especially 
when  that  processing  is  distributed  across  multiple 
individuals and culturally disparate groups. 
In  order  to  improve  our  understanding  of  collective 
cognition in military coalition environments, it is important 
to  undertake  empirical  studies  that  systematically  explore 
the effect of various types of features on the dynamics of 
collective cognitive processing. Unfortunately, the nature of 
the  coalition  environment  means  that  studies  with  human 
subjects are both difficult to design and  implement. As a 
result, it may be important to consider the use of computer 
simulation  techniques  (particularly  those  involving  multi-
agent systems) in which some aspect of collective cognitive 
processing  is  studied  in  silico.  The  problem  with  many 
multi-agent simulations, however, is that the agents lack the 
kind  of  features  that  make  the  models  of  psychological 
interest and relevance. In many cases, the agents consist of 
simple  processing  units  that  respond  in  relatively  limited 
ways to simple and unstructured inputs.  
In order to address these concerns, the current work adopts 
an  approach  to  agent  simulation  that  is  grounded  in  an 
extensive body of work in the psychological literature. The 
approach  involves  the  use  of  constraint  satisfaction 
networks  (CSNs),  which  are  used  to  model  the  temporal 
evolution of an agent‘s cognitive states (beliefs, opinions, 
attitudes, evaluations and so on) across time. A CSN is apt 
for problems which involve the simultaneous satisfaction of 
multiple soft constraints, and many types of psychological 
phenomena may be seen as involving something like this 
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capability.  Indeed,  CSNs  have  been  used  in  simulation 
studies  exploring  a  range  of  psychological  phenomena, 
including belief revision, explanation, schema completion, 
analogical  reasoning,  causal  attribution,  discourse 
comprehension,  content-addressable  memories,  cognitive 
dissonance  and  attitude  change  [2-7].  Furthermore,  CSNs 
have  been  used  to  explore  the  dynamics  of  socially-
distributed cognition [8], and this is precisely the kind of 
cognitive processing we are interested in when it comes to 
coalition organizations. 
The specific cognitive phenomenon of interest in the current 
study  is  sensemaking,  which  has  been  defined  as  ―a 
motivated,  continuous  effort  to  understand  connections 
(which can be among people, places, and events) in order to 
anticipate  their  trajectories  and  act  effectively‖  [9]. 
Sensemaking  has  also  been  discussed  at  the  collective  or 
team level as well as at the level of individual agents. Klein 
et al [10] thus define team sensemaking as ―the process by 
which a team manages and coordinates its efforts to explain 
the  current  situation  and  to  anticipate  future  situations, 
typically  under  uncertain  or  ambiguous  conditions.‖  We 
argue  that  sensemaking  can  be  approached  as  a  form  of 
constraint  satisfaction  problem,  and  CSNs  can  thus  be 
usefully  applied  to  model  the  sensemaking  efforts  of 
individuals. In addition to this, we suggest that networks of 
CSNs can be used to model at least some of the constituent 
processes  associated  with  sensemaking  at  the  collective 
level (i.e. team sensemaking). In particular, we suggest that 
the  flow  of  information  between  individual  CSNs  in  a 
network of CSNs provides a rough analogue to inter-agent 
communication  in  collective  sensemaking  situations. 
Inasmuch  as  this  is  the  case,  simulations  consisting  of 
multiple  CSNs  may  enable  us  to  explore  the  effect  of 
different  inter-agent  communication  variables  on  team 
sensemaking outcomes. 
The  experimental  studies  described  in  the  current  paper 
require agents to perform a particular task. Briefly, agents 
are  presented  with  information  about  the  features  of  a 
particular object, and they then have to form a belief about 
what the object might be. Agents establish beliefs about the 
object  by  integrating  presented  information  with 
background knowledge. A complicating feature of the task 
is  that  agents  are  not  presented  with  perfect  information 
about  an  object‘s  features.  Instead,  the  information 
resembles that seen in many military conflict situations; i.e. 
the  information  is  incomplete,  uncertain,  ambiguous  and 
conflicting. To keep the discussion as simple as possible and 
to  avoid  the  introduction  of  domain-specific  terminology, 
the  task  used  in  the  current  experiments  centres  on  the 
processing of simple feature sets associated with two types 
of animals, namely cats and birds.  
2. COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
2.1. Architecture 
The  computational  model  developed  to  explore  team 
sensemaking in the current paper is based on the consonance 
model  developed  by  Schultz  and  Lepper  [4].  Each  agent 
within the model is implemented as a CSN (following the 
design specification outlined by Schultz and Lepper), and 
these  individual  CSNs  are  connected  together  to  form  a 
network of CSNs (i.e. a network of networks). The nodes 
which make up each CSN are organized into a number of 
cognitive units, each of which represents a particular belief 
held  by  the  agent.  For  example,  the  agent  in  Figure  1 
consists  of  6  cognitive  units,  each  of  which  represents 
beliefs about two types of animals, namely cats and birds. 
Four  of  these  units  represent  beliefs  about  the  features 
typically associated with objects. They are called ‗feature 
beliefs‘. Other units represent beliefs about the object itself. 
They are called ‗object beliefs‘.  
Internally, each cognitive unit consists of two nodes which 
are connected together in a mutual inhibitory fashion (see 
Figure 2). One of these nodes is labelled as the ‗positive 
pole‘ (P), and the other is labelled as the ‗negative pole‘ (N). 
The  difference  in  activation  between  these  two  nodes 
determines  the  extent  to  which  an  agent  holds  the  belief 
represented by the cognitive unit. Thus, if the activation of 
the positive pole is high relative to the negative pole, then 
the net activation for the cognitive unit will be positive and 
the agent can be said to possess the belief represented by the 
cognitive unit. Conversely, if the activation of the negative 
 
Figure 1. Organization of cognitive units in a single agent. Circles represent 
cognitive units, each of which consists of two processing nodes. Solid lines 
symbolize excitatory connections between the units, while broken lines 
symbolize inhibitory links. Shaded circles represent beliefs about the 
features of objects (feature beliefs), while white circles represent beliefs 
about the object itself (object beliefs).  
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Figure 2. The anatomy of a cognitive unit. Each unit consists of two nodes, 
one of which is the positive pole (P) and the other is the negative pole (N). 
P and N are connected via mutual inhibitory links. In addition, each node 
has an auto-regulatory connection that connects each node to itself. The 
function of this auto-regulatory link is to dampen the node‘s activity at each 
processing cycle [see 4, for details]. All links within the cognitive unit are 
inhibitory, as is indicated by the broken lines in the figure. 
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pole  is  high  relative  to  the  positive  pole,  then  the  net 
activation  for  the  cognitive  unit  will  be  negative  and  the 
agent cannot be said to possess the belief represented by the 
cognitive unit. 
Within an agent, cognitive units can be connected to other 
cognitive units via inhibitory or excitatory links. Whether 
the connection between two cognitive units is excitatory or 
inhibitory  in  nature  depends  on  the  compatibility  or 
consistency of the beliefs represented by the cognitive units. 
In  our  simulations,  agents  are  presented  with  the  task  of 
making a decision about the type of an object (an animal) 
based  on  limited  information  about  the  presence  of  its 
associated features (e.g. whether it has feathers or fur). The 
result is that cognitive units are always connected together 
in a way that reflects the association of particular animals 
with  particular  features.  For  example,  the  ‗cat‘  cognitive 
unit is always connected to the ‗meows‘ and ‗has-fur‘ units 
because if an agent believes that a cat is present then they 
will  also  believe  in  the  presence  of  cat-related  features. 
Similarly, the ‗bird‘ cognitive unit is always connected to 
the ‗tweets‘ and ‗has-feather‘ units because of the natural 
association between birds and these features.  
Cognitive  units  that  represent  incompatible  beliefs  are 
connected via inhibitory connections. Thus, in our case, if 
an  agent  was  to  believe  that  an  unknown  object 
corresponded  to  a  cat,  it  would  not  make  sense  to 
simultaneously  believe  that  the  object  had  a  feature 
naturally associated with a bird. For example, it would not 
make sense to connect the ‗cat‘ unit and the ‗has-feathers‘ 
unit with an excitatory connection. To do so would create a 
situation where an agent held beliefs that conflicted with the 
structure  of  the  target  domain.  Agents  in  our  simulations 
always attempt to make sense of conflicting, ambiguous and 
uncertain information by changing their beliefs in ways that 
are consistent with both external information (sensory data) 
and background knowledge. For this reason, it is important 
that the pattern of excitatory and inhibitory links between 
cognitive  units  (reflecting  an  agent‘s  background 
knowledge) coincides with the properties of the domain to 
which the agent‘s beliefs apply
1. 
                                                            
1 Although it is not a feature of our model, it is obviously possible for 
cognitive units to be neither compatible or incompatible (i.e. they are not 
The pattern of connectivity between cognitive units for all 
agents  in  our  simulations  is  shown  in  Figure  1. 
Architecturally, each inter-cognition linkage is represented 
by  connections  between  the  constituent  nodes  of  the 
cognitive  unit.  Thus,  an  inter-cognition  linkage  is  not  a 
single  connection;  instead,  it  consists  of  a  total  of  eight 
connections, with two connections emanating from each of 
the nodes in the two cognitive units. In our model, a positive 
connection  between  cognitive  units  is  represented  by  the 
wiring  diagram  shown  in  Figure  3A,  and  a  negative 
connection is represented by the wiring diagram shown in 
Figure 3B. With eight connections comprising each inter-
cognition  linkage,  and  a  connectivity  pattern  between 
cognitive units based on that seen in Figure 1, it can be seen 
that  each  agent  consists  of  120  connections  between  the 
nodes  of  different  cognitive  units.  Within  each  cognitive 
unit,  there  are  an  additional  two  (inhibitory)  connections 
linking  the  two  nodes,  and  a  further  two  auto-regulatory 
connections.  The  result  is  that  each  agent  in  the  model 
consists of 12 nodes, 6 cognitive units and 144 connections. 
In addition to a sign, indicating whether a connection exerts 
an excitatory or inhibitory influence on its target node, each 
connection has a weighting that determines the amount of 
influence it exerts. Although these weights could assume a 
variety of values, in the current study we limit all weights to 
values of either 0.5 (excitatory) or -0.5 (inhibitory).   
Agents  are  connected  into  networks  via  the  inclusion  of 
linkages between agents. Each inter-agent connection is in 
fact  a  set  of  bidirectional  linkages  between  the 
corresponding  nodes  of  each  agent.  Thus,  if  agent  A  is 
connected  to  agent  B,  then  bidirectional  connections  will 
exist between each of the corresponding nodes of agent A 
and  B.  The  nodes  in  the  ‗cat‘  unit  of  agent  A  will  be 
connected to the nodes of the ‗cat‘ unit in agent B, the nodes 
of  the  ‗has-fur‘  unit  in  agent  A  will  be  connected  to  the 
nodes of the ‗has-fur‘ unit in agent B, and so on. Based on 
this organizational scheme, we can see that each inter-agent 
linkage  consists  of  24  individual  connections  (two 
connections for each node, one going from agent A to agent 
B and one going from agent B to agent A).  
                                                                                                  
associated in any way). In this case, the cognitive units can be connected by 
a zero weighted set of links, or the inter-cognition linkage can simply be 
removed. 
 
 
Figure 3. Figure showing the connectivity pattern for both positive (A) and negative (B) linkages between cognitive units. Excitatory connections are 
symbolized by solid lines, inhibitory connections by dashed lines. 
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As  with  the  connections  within  an  individual  agent,  the 
connections  between  agents  can  have  both  a  sign  and  a 
weighting value. To keep our simulations simple, we use a 
single weighting value of 0.5 for all inter-agent connections. 
Clearly,  this  is  an  oversimplification  relative  to  the  real 
world  since  the  weighting  of  the  inter-agent  connections 
determines  the  degree  to  which  one  agent  influences 
another,  and  agents  influence  one  another  to  different 
degrees based on a variety of factors (e.g. the level of trust 
that exists between them). One future extension of this work 
is  thus  to  examine  the  effect  of  variable  inter-agent 
connection  weights,  perhaps  allowing  these  weights  to 
change dynamically throughout the course of a simulation 
(see Section 4.3). 
Note that in the work reported here, we use a small network 
consisting of only 4 agents, with all agents connected to one 
another.  In  this  sense,  the  agent  network  has  a  fully-
connected  topology.  Given  the  small  number  of  agents 
involved in the simulations it did not make sense to explore 
alternative kinds of network topology (e.g. random or small-
world  networks).  As  with  the  manipulation  of  inter-agent 
connection  weights,  this  dimension  of  the  computational 
model provides a potential direction for future research (see 
Section 4.1).   
2.2. Initial Activation Vectors 
When an agent is presented with a body of environmental 
information  corresponding  to  the  presence  or  absence  of 
particular features of an object, they will attempt to make 
sense of  the information by  systematically changing their 
beliefs based on the interactions between cognitive units. A 
processing cycle thus consists of the initial presentation of 
an  activation  vector  providing  information  about  the 
presence  or  absence  of  particular  features  in  the 
environment. In our simulations, we assume that the initial 
information an agent is presented with is based on indirect 
observation  (perhaps  via  a  sensor)  and  is  therefore 
vulnerable to distortion. In particular, we assume that the 
information provided to agents resembles that presented to 
analysts and decision  makers in hostile conflict situations 
(i.e.  the  information  is  incomplete,  uncertain,  ambiguous, 
and  conflicting).  For  this  reason,  all  the  information 
presented to agents in the current simulations is imperfect. 
Perfect  information  would  consist  of  an  activation  vector 
that,  when  processed  by  the  agents,  would  immediately 
result  in  the  agents  expressing  beliefs  that  perfectly 
coincided  with  ground  truth.  For  example,  if  agents  are 
tasked with making a decision about the type of an unknown 
object, and the object is a bird, then in a situation of perfect 
information  the  agents  should  express  the  belief  that  the 
object  is  a  bird  when  presented  with  the  environmental 
information, and they should express high confidence in this 
decision  outcome.  In  contrast,  in  a  situation  of  imperfect 
information,  agents  will  form  beliefs,  but  they  may  have 
little confidence in these beliefs. In addition, some beliefs 
may be activated at the same time as other, incompatible 
beliefs.  
In  the  simulations  presented  here,  agents  were  presented 
with  imperfect  information  that  resulted  in  the  weak 
activation of beliefs, some of which were incompatible with 
other  beliefs  (the  actual  activation  values  presented  to 
agents across all simulations are presented in Table 1). We 
consider this state to resemble an initial state of confusion or 
uncertainty  that  must  be  resolved  over  the  course  of 
successive processing cycles in order to reach a particular 
decision  outcome.  The  simultaneous  activation  of 
inconsistent beliefs (cognitions) in our model leads an agent 
to  revise  their  beliefs  in  ways  that  satisfy  the  constraints 
imposed by both the external information and their internal 
background  knowledge.  This  constitutes  the  main  driving 
force for internally-driven cognitive change in our model, 
and it is the means by which agents attempt to make sense 
of ambiguous, uncertain and conflicting information. 
2.3. Processing Dynamics 
In each simulation, the activation vectors presented in Table 
1 were used to determine the initial activation levels of the 
feature nodes of each of the four agents
2. The activation of 
each node was then updated across successive processing 
cycles using the following update rules: 
                                           (1) 
when neti ≥ 0, and 
                                         (2) 
when neti < 0. In these equations, ai(t + 1) is the activation 
of unit i at time t + 1, ai(t) is the activation of unit i at time t, 
ceiling is the maximal level of activation of the node
3, floor 
is the minimum activation of the node (zero for all nodes), 
and neti is the net input to unit i, which is defined as: 
                     
 
  (3) 
where  resisti  is  a  measure  of  the  resistance  of  unit  i  to 
                                                            
2 In addition to these activation values, the positive pole of each of the 
‗bird‘  cognitive  units  within  each  agent  was  set  to  0.5.  This  initial 
activation  of  the  ‗bird‘  cognitive  unit  was  intended  to  represent  the 
expectations of each agent. Each agent therefore expected to observe a bird, 
whereas in fact the weight of evidence that agents were presented with 
suggested that the target object was, in fact, a cat. 
3 In the current simulations, positive p oles had a ceiling value of 1.0, 
whereas negative poles had a ceiling value of 0.5. The reason for this 
difference in ceiling values is explain in Schultz and Lepper [4]. 
Node  Agent A  Agent B  Agent C  Agent D  Total 
has-fur  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.0  1.1 
has-fur  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
meows  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.6 
meows  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
has-feathers  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.7 
has feathers  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
tweets  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
tweets  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Table 1. Initial activation vectors presented to agents. Shaded cells indicate 
the vectors used to activate the P nodes of cognitive units. The same set of 
activation vectors was used at the outset of every simulation reported in the 
current paper.  
 
  
having  its  activation  changed.  In  general,  the  smaller  the 
value  of  this  parameter,  the  greater  the  resistance  to 
activation  change,  and  thus  the  greater  the  resistance  to 
cognitive change. One possible use of this parameter is to 
make certain types of beliefs less resistant to change than 
others;  however,  in  the  current  simulation,  we  fixed  the 
resisti parameter at a value of 0.5 for all nodes. 
At each point in the processing cycle, n nodes are randomly 
selected and updated according to equations 1 and 2, where 
n corresponds to the number of units in the network (12 in 
our case). This continues until the pattern of activation in 
each of the agent networks settles down. Typically, in the 
case of our simulations, 20 processing cycles were sufficient 
for a stable pattern of activation to be achieved.  
In some simulations, agents were allowed to communicate 
with one another on particular cycles. When communication 
was enabled, each talking agent contributed activation to the 
nodes of listening agents. Each node was associated with a 
parameter,  comminputi,  which  is  the  weighted  sum  of 
activation received from all talking agents. On cycles where 
agents communicated, this parameter was updated according 
to the following equation: 
                   
 
  (4) 
where  Aj represents the activation value of a  node in  the 
talking agent and Wij represents the weight of the connection 
from node j (in the talking agent) to node i (in the listening 
agent). 
At the next processing cycle, comminputi was incorporated 
into  the  activation  equations  by  extending  equation  3  as 
follows: 
                      
 
               
(5) 
Once the communicated activation had been incorporated 
into  the  node‘s  current  activation  level,  comminputi  was 
reset to zero in order to avoid repetitive presentation of the 
same  communicated  information  across  successive 
processing cycles.  
3. SIMULATIONS 
Based  on  the  kinds  of  features  that  may  affect  collective 
cognition in military coalition environments (see Section 1), 
there are clearly a large number of variables that could be 
the focus of empirical investigations. In the present section, 
we  focus  on  the  communication  between  agents,  and  we 
report the results obtained with three types of experimental 
manipulation.  
3.1. Experiment 1: Communication Frequency 
In any form of socially-distributed information processing, 
it is important to understand the effect that different levels 
of inter-agent communication have on collective cognitive 
outcomes. One might assume that a team of individuals will 
function at its best when they are allowed to communicate 
to all members of a team at all stages of a problem-solving 
process. This assumption may not, however, be correct. A 
number of studies have thus suggested that precipitant forms 
of information sharing might result in sub-optimal levels of 
team performance [11]. 
Method 
In order to explore the effect of communication frequency 
on  the  temporal  evolution  of  belief  states  in  the 
aforementioned  multi-agent  model,  we  studied  groups  of 
agents  under  three  experimental  conditions.  In  the  first 
condition  (‗No  Communication‘),  we  proscribed  all  inter-
agent  communication.  All  agents  therefore  processed  the 
information that they were initially presented with, and they 
were not allowed to communicate the intermediate or final 
results  of  their  processing  to  other  agents.  In  the  second 
condition (‗Low Frequency Communication‘), agents were 
allowed to communicate on every fourth processing cycle. 
Given that each simulation was run for a total of 20 cycles, 
this enabled agents to communicate with one another a total 
of 5 times during the course of the simulation. In the third 
condition (‗High Frequency Communication‘), agents were 
allowed to communicate on every cycle of the simulation. 
This meant that at every cycle of the simulation, all agents 
were  talking  to  all  other  agents  and  communicating 
information about their belief states. 
For the purposes of this experiment, we did not opt to limit 
inter-agent communication in any way except with regard to 
frequency. Thus on every cycle that agents communicated, 
all agents communicated with every other agent. In addition, 
all  agents  communicated  information  about  all  of  their 
beliefs;  we  did  not  limit  communication  to  a  particular 
subset of agent beliefs. 
Each simulation lasted for 20 cycles, and we ran 50 separate 
simulations  for  each  of  the  agents  in  each  of  the  three 
experimental conditions (i.e. a total of 50 × 4 × 3 = 600 
simulations). 
Results 
The  results  of  the  experiment  are  presented  in  Figure  4. 
Figure  4  shows  the  net  activation  of  the  ‗cat‘  and  ‗bird‘ 
cognitive units for each of the agents in each of the three 
experimental conditions. As can be seen from the results, 
when no communication between the agents was allowed, 
agents A and B both settled on a cognitive state in which the 
‗cat‘ belief predominated. This contrasted with the results 
for agent C in which both the ‗cat‘ and ‗bird‘ beliefs were 
active.  This  agent  appeared  somewhat  ambivalent  with 
regard to the object that was presented, and they were not 
able  to  ‗make  up  their  mind‘  as  to  what  was  the  correct 
solution. Agent D showed no such problems: D settled on a 
solution by the tenth processing cycle and was unchanged 
thereafter.  
A  similar  pattern  of  results  was  obtained  in  the  second 
condition,  which  permitted  low  levels  of  communication 
between the agents (second row of tiles in Figure 4). One 
difference from the results seen in the first condition is that 
agents  A  and  B  appeared  less  confident  about  their  ‗cat‘ 
beliefs at the conclusion of the simulations.  
Finally, when frequent communication was enabled in the 
third condition, a different pattern of results was obtained. 
Now  all  the  agents  rapidly  developed  the  belief  that  the 
unknown object was a bird. This is despite the fact that the 
weight of evidence from the body of initial information (see 
Table 1) suggests that the unknown object was a cat
4. 
3.2. Experiment 2: Type of Communicated Information 
Experiment 1 varied the frequency with which agents were 
allowed to communicate, but it did not seek to control the 
kind of information that was actually communicated. When 
we look at the kinds of beliefs that agents in the simulation 
may entertain, we can see two distinct types of beliefs: those 
corresponding  to  beliefs  about  the  features  of  objects 
(‗feature beliefs‘), and those corresponding to beliefs about 
the objects themselves (‗object beliefs‘). As an extension of 
Experiment  1,  therefore,  we  might  consider  the  extent  to 
which  the  type  of  communicated  information  affects  the 
                                                            
4 Note that the total activation associated with cat-related feature units in 
Table 1 (summed across all agents) is higher than that associated with bird-
related feature units. 
dynamics of social information processing.  
In  situations  where  only  the  ‗feature  beliefs‘  are 
communicated,  agents  may  be  seen  as  restricting  their 
communication to the information they have received from 
external sources (e.g. sensor systems) (or at least as limiting 
their conversation to  the ‗thoughts‘  they  have about  such 
information). In situations  where only the ‗object beliefs‘ 
are communicated, agents may be seen as communicating 
their opinions on what the unknown object actually is (i.e. 
the  outcome  of  the  sensemaking  process).  This  latter 
situation  may  correspond  to  a  state-of-affairs  in  which 
decision  outcomes  are  communicated  without  any 
supporting information (or rationale). The former situation 
may  correspond  to  a  state-of-affairs  in  which  received 
information  is  subjected  to  some  limited  information 
processing and then communicated without a final decision 
being reached.  
Method 
The  experimental  design  was  a  2  ×  2  factorial  design  in 
which one factor (frequency of communication) was derived 
from the previous experiment. In this case, the factor had 
two  levels:  ‗Low  Frequency  Communication‘  (LFC)  and 
‗High Frequency Communication‘ (HFC) corresponding to 
the low  and  high  frequency  communication conditions of 
the previous experiment. The other factor (information type) 
had  two  levels  based  on  whether  agents  communicated 
 
Figure 4. Results for Experiment 1. Each graphic tile shows the results obtained for a particular agent in a particular experimental condition. The first row 
illustrates the results obtained in the ‗No Communication‘ condition, the second row illustrates the results obtained in the ‗Low Frequency Communication‘ 
condition, and the third row illustrates the results obtained in the ‗High Frequency Communication‘ condition. The blue data series represents the net 
activation of the ‗cat‘ cognitive unit (reflecting the agent‘s belief that a cat is present), while the yellow data series represents the net activation of the ‗bird‘ 
cognitive unit (reflecting the agent‘s belief that a bird is present). 
 
 
 
  
information about ‗feature beliefs‘ or ‗object beliefs‘. As for 
Experiment 1, each simulation lasted for 20 cycles, and we 
ran  50  separate  simulations  for  each  agent  in  each 
experimental  condition  (i.e.  a  total  of  50  ×  4  ×  4  =  800 
simulations). 
Results 
The  results  from  Experiment  2  are  presented  in  Table  2. 
Table 2 shows the  net activation values  for the  ‗cat‘ and 
‗bird‘ cognitive units for each agent in each experimental 
condition  at  the  conclusion  of  the  simulations  (i.e.  at 
processing cycle 20).   
In the case of ‗feature beliefs‘ the pattern of results obtained 
for the low frequency communication condition was similar 
to  that  obtained  for  the  low  frequency  communication 
condition of Experiment 1. In both cases, agents A and B 
end the simulation with the ‗cat‘ belief predominating, and 
agents  C  and  D  both  end  the  simulation  with  the  ‗bird‘ 
belief  predominating.  For  the  high  frequency 
communication  condition,  the  results  are  again  similar  to 
those  seen  in  Experiment  1:  all  agents  conclude  the 
simulation believing that the unknown object corresponds to 
a bird. 
In the case of ‗object beliefs‘, the pattern of results is also 
similar to that seen in Experiment 1. The results from these 
experiments therefore seem to suggest that the distinction 
between ‗feature beliefs‘ and ‗object beliefs‘ in the current 
simulation  is  of  little  significance  when  it  comes  to 
understanding  the  potential  impact  of  different  types  of 
communicated  information  on  agents‘  sensemaking 
capabilities.    
3.3. Experiment 3: Timing of Inter-Agent 
Communication 
In addition to the frequency of communication, we can also 
think  about  the  potential  effect  of  the  timing  of 
communication  on  collective  cognitive  processing.  For 
example, rather than allow communication at every cycle of 
the simulation (as was the case in the aforementioned high 
frequency  communication  conditions)  we  could  allow 
agents  to  communicate  with  high  frequency  at  particular 
points in a simulation (for example, at the beginning or the 
end of the simulation). One reason to think that this may be 
important is that previous computer simulation studies have 
suggested  that  early  communication  may  cause  agents  to 
give undue weight to certain features of a problem. In one 
study,  for  example,  the  cognitive  anthropologist,  Edwin 
Hutchins,  investigated  the  effect  of  inter-agent 
communication  on  the  ability  of  agents  to  arrive  at  an 
accurate shared interpretation of ambiguous environmental 
information. What Hutchins  [8] discovered was that early 
forms of interaction led to a situation of confirmation bias in 
which agents failed to give due weight to information that 
conflicted with their initial interpretation of some external 
state-of-affairs.  
Method 
To understand the effect of early or late communication on 
the dynamics of agent processing, we ran an experiment in 
which agents were allowed to communicate on cycles 1-5 or 
cycles 16-20 of a 30 cycle simulation. Given the apparently 
insignificant role played by information type in determining 
cognitive outcomes (see Experiment 2), we allowed agents 
to communicate information about all of their beliefs. 
Results  
The results of the study are presented in Figure 5. As can be 
seen  from  Figure  5,  when  agents  were  allowed  to 
communicate  at  the  beginning  of  the  simulation,  they 
rapidly converged on a particular interpretation in which the 
‗bird  belief‘  predominated.  In  contrast,  when 
communication  was  restricted  to  a  later  stage  of  the 
simulation, agents tended to settle on a pattern of beliefs that 
resembled  that  seen  when  they  engaged  in  no 
communication at all (see Figure 4 – first row of tiles). This 
pattern of results is particularly noticeable for agents A and 
B.  The  temporal  evolution  of  their  belief  profiles  was 
completely transformed as a result of participation in early 
(as opposed to late) forms of inter-agent communication. It 
is also worth noting that the activation of the ‗cat‘ unit in 
agent C was higher (relative to the ‗bird‘ unit) in the late 
communication condition. This contrasted with the pattern 
of  results  seen  in  Experiments  1  and  2  in  which  the  net 
activation of the ‗bird‘ unit was generally higher than the 
‗cat‘ unit for agent C. Given that the  weight of evidence 
suggests  the  presence  of  a  cat  (see  Table  1),  this  might 
suggest that delayed communication has a positive effect in 
terms  of  promoting  correct  interpretations  under  highly 
Cognitive Unit  LFC/Feature Beliefs  LFC/Object Beliefs  HFC/Feature Beliefs  HFC/Object Beliefs 
Agent A – Cat  0.40  0.61  0.04  -0.32 
Agent A – Bird  0.10  -0.11   0.46  0.82 
Agent B – Cat  0.43  0.43   -0.02  -0.35 
Agent B – Bird  0.07  0.07  0.52  0.85 
Agent C – Cat  0.16  0.13  0.07  -0.44 
Agent C – Bird  0.34  0.37  0.43  0.94 
Agent D – Cat  -0.50  -0.50  -0.50   -0.50 
Agent D – Bird  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
 
Table 2. Results of Experiment 2. Table shows the net activation values for the ‗cat‘ and ‗bird‘ cognitive units for each agent in each experimental condition 
at the conclusion of the simulations (i.e. at the 20
th processing cycle of the simulations). Each of the values in the table cells is averaged over 50 simulations. 
(LFC = Low Frequency Communication; HFC = High Frequency Communication) 
 
 
 
  
uncertain or ambiguous conditions – precisely the kind of 
conditions identified by Klein et al [10] in their analysis of 
team sensemaking. 
3.4. General Discussion 
The results of these studies suggest the following: 
1.  As the frequency of communication increases, agents 
tend to rapidly converge on a common interpretation of 
noisy  environmental  data  (see  Experiment  1).  Thus, 
when communication was allowed at every cycle of a 
simulation, agents quickly settled on the belief that a 
bird  was  present  (see  Figure  4  –  third  row). 
Unfortunately, this is not consistent with the weight of 
evidence provided by the initial datasets (see Table 1) 
which indicate the presence of a cat. 
2.  The  type  of  information  communicated  by  agents 
(information  about  object  features  or  object  type) 
seems  to  have  little  effect  on  the  pattern  of  results 
obtained  in  low  and  high  frequency  communication 
conditions (see Experiment 2). 
3.  Communication  that  takes  place  early  on  in  a 
simulation  tends  to  lead  to  rapid  convergence  on  a 
particular interpretation of the data, and agents seem to 
express high confidence in these interpretations. This 
result  is  not  seen  when  communication  takes  place 
later on in the simulation. In this case, the pattern of 
results resembles that seen when agents engage in no 
communication whatsoever. 
The  effect  of  high  frequency  communication  and  early 
communication  in  these  studies  is  particularly  interesting. 
What  seems  to  happen  in  these  conditions  is  that  undue 
significance is given to agents‘ initial expectations about the 
kind  of  object  they  will  encounter.  Agents  started  the 
simulation with the expectation that they would encounter a 
bird, and this may have been reinforced in situations where 
agents transmitted information about their initial views and 
interpretations of the environmental data. This explanation 
cannot, however, account  for all  of the simulation results 
obtained.  In  Experiment  2,  for  instance,  communication 
about  ‗object  beliefs‘  was  disabled  in  one  of  the 
experimental conditions, and yet this did not significantly 
alter the pattern of results obtained.  
In addition to the effect of initial expectancies, it may be 
that precipitant forms of information sharing lead agents to 
assign undue significance to information that is compatible 
or consistent  with their initial views, especially  when the 
information they receive is ambiguous  or uncertain. Thus 
even in situations where agent communication is restricted 
to ‗feature beliefs‘, this still allows for the transmission of 
some information that is consistent with an agent‘s initial 
expectations,  and,  in  this  situation,  the  agent  may  assign 
greater weight to the ‗consistent‘ information they receive 
from other agents and discount the information they have 
acquired or gathered themselves. 
4. MODEL EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The  simulation  results  described  in  the  previous  section 
represent an early attempt to develop a computational model 
for collective sensemaking that draws on the previous use of 
CSNs to examine psychological phenomena. Previous work 
has suggested how CSNs could be used to model aspects of 
individual cognition [e.g. 4], and the current work attempts 
to extend these efforts by applying CSNs to the problem of 
collective  cognition.  Currently,  however,  the  approach 
features a number of limitations which need to be addressed 
in future work. In addition, there are a rich range of further 
simulations  studies  that  could  be  undertaken  based  on  a 
consideration of the  kind of features  that  might plausibly 
affect  collective  cognition  in  military  coalition 
environments.  Some  ideas  for  future  research  and 
development work are detailed below.  
 
Figure 5. Results for Experiment 3.Each graphic tile shows the results obtained for a particular agent in a particular experimental condition. The first row 
illustrates the results obtained in the ‗Early Communication‘ condition, while the second row illustrates the results obtained in the ‗Late Communication‘ 
condition. The blue data series represents the net activation of the ‗cat‘ cognitive unit (reflecting the agent‘s belief that a cat is present), while the yellow data 
series represents the net activation of the ‗bird‘ cognitive unit (reflecting the agent‘s belief that a bird is present). 
 
 
 
  
4.1. Network Topology  
As mentioned in Section 2.1, one extension of the current 
work is to explore the effect of different network topologies 
(e.g.  random,  small-world,  and  fully-connected)  on 
collective sensemaking. Given the size of the agent teams 
examined in the current work, it did not make sense to vary 
the network topology in systematic ways. However, other 
work has shown that  network topology affects the  rate at 
which  information  flows  through  a  community  of  agents, 
and this can sometimes exert effects on collective cognition 
[11, 12]. 
Another  factor  to  consider  here  concerns  the  difference 
between dynamic and static network topologies [see 11, 13]. 
Most multi-agent simulations use communication networks 
with  static  topologies;  i.e.  topologies  that  are  relatively 
invariant  across  the  course  of  information  processing.  In 
contrast  to  this  situation,  many  of  the  networks  that  are 
encountered in the real world have topologies that are highly 
dynamic.  A  consideration  of  dynamic  networks  is 
particularly  important  in  the  context  of  military  coalition 
environments  because  of  the  increasing  reliance  on 
MANETS  and  wireless  communication  technologies  [see 
11]. 
4.2. Agent Networks 
The agents in the current model feature a relatively small 
number  of  cognitive  units  (i.e.  6),  with  uniform  absolute 
weights between the units (i.e. 0.5). One extension of the 
current model involves the development of networks with a 
greater  number  of  cognitive  units,  a  greater  diversity  of 
cognitive units, and variable weightings between the units.  
A greater diversity of cognitive units could be realized by 
recognizing the existence of different types of cognitions. 
Schultz and Lepper [4] for example, recognize three types 
of  cognitive  unit:  justification,  evaluation  and  behaviour 
units. The significance of this distinction lies in the value 
assigned  to  the  resistance  parameter  associated  with  the 
nodes within a cognitive unit. In the current study, we use a 
common resistance parameter of 0.5 for all nodes; however,  
Schultz and Lepper adopt a different scheme in which some 
units  rely  on  smaller  resistance  parameters.  This  has  the 
effect of making the cognitive units differentially resistant 
to  change,  which  may  have  important  consequences  for 
cognitive processing
5. 
The weightings between cognitive units in our study have 
fixed  absolute  values  of  0.5  and  these  weightings  are 
invariant across the course of the simulation. One extension 
of the current work is thus to examine the effect of variable 
weightings  between  cog nitive  units.  Since  each  linkage 
between  cognitive  units  represents  a  psychological 
                                                            
5  This  may  provide  one  way  of  re-examining  the  effect  of  type  of 
communicated information on collective sensemaking. One of the reasons 
Experiment 2 may have failed to yield any interesting results is because of 
the  lack  of  any  real  differences  between  ‗feature  beliefs‘  and  ‗object 
beliefs‘. The use of different resistance parameters could be one way in 
which differences between these cognitions could be introduced. 
implication  or  association  between  belief  states,  the 
weighting associated with inter-cognition linkages may be 
deemed  to  reflect  the  strength  of  this  implication  or 
association.  We  assume  that  inter-cognition  linkages  are 
acquired as a result of prior learning, experience or training, 
and that they reflect the background knowledge (including 
assumptions,  stereotypes  and  prejudices)  that  an  agent 
brings  to  bear  on  a  particular  problem-solving  activity. 
Inasmuch as this is true, we can see individual variability in 
the inter-cognition linkages as reflecting differences in the 
background  knowledge  that  was  acquired  before  the 
simulation exercise. 
The  actual  values  for  the  weights  associated  with  inter-
cognition  linkages  could  be  established  in  a  number  of 
ways.  They  could  be  subject  to  manual  manipulation 
(although  this  clearly  becomes  unwieldy  for  simulations 
involving large numbers of  agents  with large numbers of 
cognitive  units);  they  could  be  subject  to  some  sort  of 
randomized  adjustment  procedure  (although  this  risks 
distancing agents from the knowledge-rich contingencies of 
the relevant task domain); or they could be acquired as a 
result of some prior learning experience. In respect of this 
latter  possibility,  previous  work  has  shown  how  the 
connection  weights  for  constraint  satisfaction  networks 
might be learned [see 14]. 
Individual  differences  in  inter-cognition  linkages  may 
provide one way in which the current model can be applied 
to  the  problem  of  understanding  the  impact  of  cultural 
differences  in  military  coalitions.  One  way  of  viewing 
cultural differences is to see them as reflecting statistically-
significant differences in the cognitive structures associated 
with  the  members  of  different  cultural  groups  [15].  This 
means  that  cultural  differences  could  be  explored  in  the 
current model by varying inter-cognition linkages based on 
group membership criteria.  
Unlike the case with inter-agent linkages, we do not see a 
major role for inter-cognition linkages that are dynamically 
updated across the course of a simulation. The reason for 
this is that we see sensemaking as more a case of applying 
background  knowledge  and  experience  in  order  to 
understand some situation or system state, rather than a case 
of learning new things. Sensemaking (at least in the kinds of 
cases  we  are  exploring),  we  suggest,  capitalizes  on  past 
learning, but it does not involve any new learning. 
4.3. Inter-Agent Communication 
The simulations presented here used networks in which all 
agents were connected to all other agents using a standard 
connection weighting (i.e. 0.5). Since the weight assigned to 
an inter-agent link affects the influence exerted by one agent 
over another, it is important to consider models in which 
such weights have variable values. One interpretation of the 
weight value is that it represents the degree of trust between 
agents. Thus high trust between agents is reflected in links 
that have high weight values, and low trust is reflected in 
links that have low weight values. In the extreme case, the  
weights between two agents may be zero (reflecting a case 
of zero trust), in which case the effect is the same as if the 
agents never communicate.  
Future  work  could  explore  the  impact  of  variable  and 
dynamically  updated  trust  weights.  One  example  of  how  
this  scheme  might  be  implemented  is  provided  by  Van 
Overwalle and Heylighen [16]. They present a network-of-
networks  approach  to  modelling  collective  cognition  in 
which  each  agent  is  represented  by  a  recurrent  auto-
associative  neural  network.  The  weights  associated  with 
inter-agent linkages in their model are updated during the 
course of a simulation by an updating rule that factors in the 
similarity of belief states between communicating agents. In 
essence,  agents  who  share  similar  beliefs  (i.e.  express 
agreement)  have  their  channel  of  communication 
strengthened so that they exert a greater influence on one 
another during future processing cycles. The reverse applies 
to agents who have dissimilar beliefs. 
4.4. Confidence 
Another  factor  for  consideration  in  the  context  of  future 
work is the confidence that agents have in their belief states 
and the extent to which this influences the communication 
of  belief  states.  In  the  current  simulation,  confidence  is 
represented by the level of net activation of a cognitive unit: 
an agent has high confidence in a belief if the net activation 
of  the  unit  approximates  its  maximum  activation  level. 
Future studies could explore the effect of restricting inter-
agent  communication  to  situations  in  which  agents  are 
required to have high confidence in their cognitions. This 
could be accomplished by incorporating a threshold function 
for cognitive state propagation.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Cognitive processing activities such as problem-solving and 
decision-making in military coalitions often depend on the 
coordinated interaction of multiple, distributed agents who 
communicate  with  one  another  via  one  or  more  coalition 
communication networks. In order to begin to understand 
the dynamics of collective cognitive processing in military 
coalition  environments,  we  developed  a  computational 
model based on the use of multiple interacting agents, each 
of which was implemented as a CSN. Our results suggest 
that some aspects of inter-agent communication can affect 
agents‘ ability to correctly interpret bodies of ambiguous, 
uncertain and conflicting information. For example,  when 
agents  were  allowed  to  participate  in  high  frequency 
communication at the outset of a problem-solving task, they 
tended  to  converge  on  an  inaccurate  interpretation  of 
environmental  information.  This  effect  was  not  observed 
when agents  were allowed to independently  ‗think about‘ 
some  body  of  information  and  then  come  to  their  own 
conclusion  before  engaging  in  communication.  In  these 
situations, an agent‘s beliefs were generally resistant to the 
effects  exerted  by  agents  who  had  come  to  different 
conclusions. These results are generally supportive of other 
results in the distributed cognition literature that have used 
CSNs [see 8], and they suggest that the future use of CSN-
based models could have value in terms of improving our 
understanding  of  socially-distributed  cognition  in  military 
coalition environments. 
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